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Letter to Majority Leader Mitch McConnell and Minority Leader Chuck Schumer from 
Governors Kasich, Hickenlooper, Bullock, Baker, Sandoval, Wolf, and Edwards, 16 June 
2017 
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Governor Sandoval
Letter to Majority Leader Mitch McConnell and Minority Leader Chuck Schumer from 
Governors Hickenlooper, Bullock, Sandoval, Hogan, Wolf, Edwards, McAuliffe, Baker, 
Kasich, and Scott, 26 July 2017 
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Governor Sandoval
Letter to Majority Leader Mitch McConnell and Minority Leader Chuck Schumer from 
Governors Hickenlooper, Walker, Wolf, Edwards, Baker, Kasich, Bullock, McAuliffe, 
Sandoval, and Scott, 19 September 2017
Republicans in Congress
Why do we see governors diverge from 
their national co-partisans on major 
policy issues?
Plan for the Talk
• How should we think about the behavior of Sandoval and other 
Republican governors in 2017?
• What did we see during the 2017 ACA repeal fight, and how does it 
compare to previous national health policy debates?
• What should we watch going forward?
Overview of the ACA’s State-Based Provisions
• Medicaid expansion
• Under NFIB v. Sebelius (2012), states could not be required to expand Medicaid
• As of 2018, 32 states have chosen to do so
• This includes 11 states who had a Republican governor at the time of expansion
• State-based marketplaces
• States can create their own marketplaces or rely on the federal government to so
• Under King v. Burwell (2015), individuals can access subsidies and tax credits on 
either kind of exchange
• Ability to pursue flexibility in the form of waivers
• Medicaid waivers
• ACA-specific waivers
What We Know About States’ ACA 
Implementation Decisions
• Largely a partisan story
(Barrilleaux and Rainey 2014; Jacobs and Callaghan 2013)
• Biggest predictors of opposition were whether a state’s governor was a Republican and whether 
Republicans controlled the legislature
• Also helps explain differences in speed
• But other things mattered, too
(Hertel-Fernandez, Skocpol, and Lynch 2016; Rose 2015; Jacobs and Callaghan 2013)
• Strength of organized business support, especially relative to pressure from conservative networks
• Pro-expansion health care providers were especially important
• States with higher existing levels of Medicaid benefits moved faster
• Limited evidence of need driving decision-making 
(Barrilleaux and Rainey 2014; Jacobs and Callaghan 2013)
• Uninsured population
• Amount of existing payments to high-need hospitals
• Per capita income
Are Governors Being Driven By Electoral 
Concerns?
• One possible explanation is that governors are afraid of being blamed 
for their national colleagues’ decision to cut benefits. 
• How good are voters at distinguishing which level of government is 
responsible for something?
• Answer: they can do it, but only sometimes, in certain circumstances.
(Arceneaux 2006, Malhotra and Kuo 2008)
Are Governors Being Driven By Electoral 
Concerns?
• An alternative electoral story: what happens at the state level is really 
about what’s happening at the national level.
• Or, it’s the president, all the way down.
(Rogers 2016; Sances 2017)
• State legislators’ electoral fate is largely determined by presidential approval
• Evidence that voters punish the president’s party even for local tax increases enacted 
via direct democracy.
• Partisanship also plays a role.  When responsibility in a policy area is 
shared, voters assign blame to whichever actor is of the other party.
(Brown 2010)
What We Know About the ACA and Political 
Behavior
• Evidence that Medicaid beneficiaries are significantly less likely to 
register, vote, and take other kinds of political action.
(Michener 2016, 2017)
• Evidence that Medicaid expansion increased political participation.  
But:
• Increase in turnout for new beneficiaries but also a backlash effect among 
conservative voters 
• Didn’t necessarily persist past 2014
(Haselswerdt 2017; Clinton and Sances 2017)

Did Electoral Incentives Matter?
• 17 Republican governors in states that expanded Medicaid
• 5 are term-limited and can’t run again
• 7 are running for re-election in 2018
• 5 are not running in 2018
• Most active group was the term-limited governors, including Sandoval 
and Kasich
• Second most active group was those running for re-election.  Includes 
repeal proponents Ducey and Hutchinson and opponents Baker, 
Hogan, and Scott.
Was it about policy 
effects?
Is 2017 Unusual?
Key Differences Between 1997 and 2017
• Divided vs. unified government
• Losses vs. gains
• Bipartisan
• Incremental change
• Popular beneficiaries
• “As chief implementers of federal law, governors welcome the opportunity 
the budget provides for governors to build on their successes in extending 
health insurance to more children.”—Governor Bob Miller (D-Nev.)
Conclusion
• Little reason to expect that governors’ behavior was driven by 
concerns that Medicaid beneficiaries would punish them electorally.
• An electoral story that emphasizes broader place of ACA in national 
politics is more likely.
• Some suggestive evidence that policy effects may have played a role.
What to Watch Going Forward
• Now that major legislative efforts to repeal ACA have ended, where 
else might we see state-federal tension?
• Massachusetts proposal to adopt a drug formulary for Medicaid beneficiaries
• Idaho proposal to allow for sale of non-ACA compliant plans
• Are there other policy areas where we will see this play out?
• Education
• Environment
